Australia’s inflation problem is structural, not cyclical, and interest rates are the wrong tool to fix it.

I joined ausbiz to discuss inflation, where we are in the credit cycle, and where I see the opportunity.

Interest rates are a blunt instrument designed to suppress demand. Yet housing (rents, new homes, council rates and electricity) is the single biggest driver of inflation, and higher rates do little to fix a supply shortage. In effect, the RBA is fighting a structural shortage with a demand tool. Government spending that grows faster than the economy can, across every level of government, only adds to the pressure.

On credit, this is not a GFC-style freeze. It is a slow credit crunch. Borrowing from Howard Marks’ view that markets are driven by behaviour as much as economics, I believe the broader market is sitting in anxiety, while private credit is roughly halfway through the fear phase after several high-profile collapses.

That is where the opportunity lies. In lending, the deals to worry about are the ones written last year, not today. Debt pricing has reset, margins are wider, and borrowers are noticeably more cautious than a year ago. More short-term lending that banks would traditionally provide is now coming to private credit.

The best investors don’t act on emotion. They hold some liquidity because no one can pick the bottom, but they make sure they are in the market when it turns. Sitting on cash alone is not a strategy.

Watch the interview with Ausbiz

The Money Hasn’t Disappeared—the Appetite for Risk Has.

The RBA’s inflation dilemma: fighting inflation today, starving housing supply and Small Business tomorrow.

Australia is in a credit crunch, not the kind most people remember from the GFC. No bank has collapsed, and no funding market has frozen. Money is still out there. What’s gone is the risk appetite.

Lenders are pickier, refinancing takes longer and costs more, and borrowers who assumed they could roll into the next loan are finding the next lender isn’t there. I call it a soft credit crunch.

The collapse of Bathla Group into administration, a nervous bond market and the withdrawn Firmus IPO are all symptoms of the same shift in sentiment. Now the Reserve Bank has raised the cash rate for the fifth time this year to 4.85%, and the property and credit cycles are turning together.

Here’s what worries me. Rate rises are meant to cool demand, but this economy’s biggest problem is supply. Higher rates make new developments harder to fund, squeeze small businesses and, over time, mean fewer homes get built. We may be fighting today’s inflation by creating tomorrow’s.

The credit cycle Howard Marks warned about

Few people understand credit cycles better than Howard Marks, co-founder of Oaktree Capital Management. I’ve read his memos for years, and more than two decades ago he described a pattern that keeps repeating: prosperity encourages lending, competition erodes standards, losses follow, and lenders pull back.

That’s where we are. Years of cheap money and a flood of capital into private credit pushed some managers to chase deployment over discipline. As Marks put it in his April 2026 memo on private credit, some direct lenders “accepted too much money and invested it too fast”.

His other point matters as much: cycles are driven by people, not just numbers. Investors ignore risk on the way up and overreact on the way down, sometimes pulling money from perfectly sound deals.

A credit crunch doesn’t mean money disappears. It means lenders stop offering it on yesterday’s terms. That’s the soft credit crunch: the capital is still there; it just isn’t flowing freely.

What has changed at the lending desk

Lenders now want more equity, lower loan-to-value ratios and tighter covenants, and they’re valuing security on today’s prices, not last year’s. Loans written in the good times are maturing into a very different market. The borrowers in trouble aren’t necessarily the ones with poor assets; they’re the ones whose repayment plan depends on finding another lender. A refinance is only an exit if the next lender is there. Good borrowers with a clear way out can still get money, at a price. Projects whose numbers no longer stack up can’t. Much of this pressure also points to an inflation problem that interest rates alone can’t fix.

The Reserve Bank is fighting the wrong fire.

The Reserve Bank is in a bind. Interest rates are a blunt tool: they work by making borrowing dearer and choking off spending. But much of our inflation comes from the supply side, above all housing, along with government charges and costs that barely respond to rate rises.

Headline inflation hit 4.3% in the year to September. Housing was the biggest contributor, up 5.2%, driven by rents, new dwelling costs, council rates and electricity.

Oil gets much of the political blame, and fuel is part of the story. Petrol prices are up almost 24% over the year, and transport added close to a percentage point to September’s headline rate, second only to housing. But the oil shock is showing up in headline inflation far more than in the underlying measure. When Russia invaded Ukraine, Brent crude averaged about US$100 a barrel in 2022, and underlying inflation peaked at 6.8%. Brent has been even higher in recent weeks, averaging around US$124 in October, yet underlying inflation is 3.7%. Rate rises can’t bring down the global price of oil, and the largest single contributor to the domestic inflation that remains is housing, the one area where higher rates make the problem worse.

Two oil shocks, very different inflation: underlying inflation vs Brent crude oil

Source: ABS / RBA trimmed mean, quarterly year-ended (2021–2026 from published releases; earlier years approximate); EIA Brent annual averages; 2025–26 monthly averages via countryeconomy.com. Shaded columns mark oil shocks; green band is the RBA’s 2–3% target.

Some of this will ease as demand slows. But no rate rise has ever released more land, sped up a planning approval, made a builder more productive or added a single dwelling. By raising finance costs and killing project feasibility, higher rates can actually make the housing shortage worse.

None of this means the RBA should ignore inflation. It can’t. But monetary policy is carrying too much of the load, and government plays a big part.

Public demand is now close to 29% of the economy, against a pre-pandemic average of about 23.5%. Government spending doesn’t slow when rates go up, so the Reserve Bank has to lean harder on everyone who responds: mortgage holders, businesses that rely on credit, and developers trying to add housing. Every level of government has also added to costs through taxes, charges, red tape and policies that hold back productivity.

Rates clearly have a role in fighting inflation. My concern is that leaning on them alone, without tackling supply and public spending, delivers more economic pain for less and less benefit. We risk winning today’s inflation fight by starving the housing supply we need to win tomorrow’s.

Property: from two speeds to one direction

You can already see the effects in property. The Melbourne Cup Day rise took the cash rate from 4.60% to 4.85%, the fifth increase this year and the highest level since 2008. It wasn’t unanimous: three of the nine board members wanted to hold. The RBA concedes that growth is slowing, property prices are falling, and unemployment is rising, yet it still expects inflation to stay above target until late 2027.

The market was already absorbing the first four rises. National dwelling values fell 1.2% in October, the seventh monthly fall in a row, and are now about 6.7% below the March peak. What looked like a two-speed correction is becoming a national one. In October, Brisbane fell 2.0%, Perth 1.7%, Sydney 1.6% and Melbourne 0.8%.

From two speeds to one: monthly dwelling value change by capital city

Source: Cotality Home Value Index, monthly % change. October 2026 from the 2 November 2026 release; earlier months from the 1 October 2026 release and may have been revised since. Dashed lines mark RBA cash rate rises (3 Feb, 17 Mar, 5 May, 29 Sep and 3 Nov 2026) and the Federal Budget (12 May 2026).

Sydney is now more than 10% below its February peak, and Melbourne is close to 8% below its November 2025 high. Sales volumes, auction clearance rates and consumer sentiment have all weakened, and as usual they turned first: clearance rates have been stuck below 50% since mid-year, and sentiment fell to 80.4 in October.

This matters well beyond house prices. Falling valuations mean lenders advance less, borrowers need more equity, and projects that worked a year ago no longer get funded. The property cycle and the credit cycle start feeding each other.

Where the opportunity lies

In my view, every credit cycle eventually creates opportunity for investors who can tell the difference between falling prices and failing fundamentals. The best openings rarely come when credit is cheap, and competition squeezes returns. They come when capital gets choosy, values reset, and borrowers have to compete for funding.

That doesn’t mean you should try to pick the bottom. Nobody can, which is why patience is worth so much right now. In private credit, tighter conditions mean better pricing, lower leverage and stronger protections for lenders. But the same conditions put pressure on loans already written: falling valuations and harder refinancing raise the risk of defaults, delays and losses, and investors in private credit funds can be exposed to those losses and to limits on withdrawals. But a higher yield isn’t the same as a better investment. What counts is asset quality, a realistic valuation, a sound balance sheet, and a credible way out.

At this point in the cycle, the difference between lenders shows up less in the returns they advertise than in how disciplined they behaved through the cycle: what they lent against, how much, and on what terms. Capital that waits indefinitely can miss the reset, and capital that rushes in because rates have risen can be caught by it. What matters is the flexibility to act when risk and reward line up.

How the cycle ends

Property corrections and credit crunches don’t end at the same time. A property correction starts to settle once lower prices bring buyers back. A credit crunch ends only when lenders regain confidence, balance sheets are repaired, and capital is willing to take risk again. That usually takes a lot longer.

For more than a decade, low rates, plentiful liquidity and rising government spending let leverage build and asset prices climb. Now the market is unwinding those excesses. Borrowers will have to cut debt, add more equity, or sell. Some projects won’t go ahead, business investment will be curtailed, and some lenders will take losses on decisions made in the good times.

Joseph Schumpeter called it creative destruction: capital moving from weaker hands to more productive ones. It hurts, but it’s how markets restore discipline.

Policymakers will be tempted to step in whenever it gets painful. Too much intervention drags out the imbalances the market is trying to fix. The real test is telling necessary market discipline apart from damage caused by policy failures.

As Marks reminds us, cycles are inevitable; what matters is how you behave through them. The lenders who come out strongest won’t be the ones who lent the most in the boom. They’ll be the ones who cared about security and underwriting before the cycle turned. And the investors best placed for the next upswing will be those who stayed patient, managed risk and recognised when sentiment had gone too far to take the opportunity.

The era of cheap money rewarded leverage. The next era will reward discipline.

Important information

Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293.
The information provided is general in nature and reflects the views of the author at the time of publication. The information has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation or needs, and does not constitute personal financial product advice, investment advice or a recommendation. Opinions and forward-looking statements are inherently uncertain and may not prove correct. Third-party data is drawn from the sources cited and has not been independently verified, and reference to or quotation of any third party does not imply that party’s affiliation with, or endorsement of, Msquared Capital.
Not an offer to invest. Investments in funds managed by the Msquared Capital group are not bank deposits, may be illiquid, and the performance of those funds, return of capital or payment of distributions are not guaranteed. Before making any investment decision, you should consider whether the information is appropriate having regard to your objectives, financial situation and needs, read the relevant fund disclosure documents, and seek independent financial advice.

Sources

  1. ABS, CPI rose 4.3% in the year to September 2026, media release, 28 October 2026.
  2. ABS National Accounts, June quarter 2026 (via Queensland Treasury summary, 2 September 2026); MacroBusiness / IFM Investors, public demand share of GDP, February and June 2026.
  3. IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2026, as reported by The New Daily, 13 October 2026.
  4. AIHW, Home ownership and housing tenure (2021 Census).
  5. Bank forecasts (CBA, NAB, Westpac, ANZ, 28 October 2026) and ASX RBA Rate Tracker (29 October 2026 close), via Property Investment Professionals, 31 October 2026. Repayment and borrowing-capacity figures are illustrative estimates from the same source.
  6. Cotality Home Value Index and auction clearance rates (2 November 2026 release); Westpac–Melbourne Institute Consumer Sentiment Index.
  7. Bloomberg, Australian private credit hit by big banks’ retreat, October 2026.
  8. Howard Marks, Oaktree Capital memo “What’s Going on in Private Credit?” (9 April 2026) https://www.oaktreecapital.com/insights/memo/whats-going-on-in-private-credit9. Reserve Bank of Australia, Statement by the Monetary Policy Board: Monetary Policy Decision, 3 November 2026.
  9. EIA Brent crude annual averages; countryeconomy.com Brent monthly averages, 2025–26; ABS / RBA trimmed mean inflation; ABS CPI contributions by group, September 2026.
  10. The Urban Developer, Bathla’s $3.4b collapse enters new phase as construction shuts down, 25 September 2026. https://www.theurbandeveloper.com/articles/bathla-update-construction-shut-down
  11. ABC News, Data centre operator Firmus pulls blockbuster ASX float after lacklustre demand, 9 October 2026, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-10-09/firmus-float-gets-pulled-following-
  12. ABC News, Data centre operator Firmus pulls blockbuster ASX float after lacklustre demand, 9 October 2026, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-10-09/firmus-float-gets-pulled-following-lacklustre-investor-demand/107246230 lacklustre-investor demand/107246230

 

Is a soft credit crunch coming?

The correction is deeper than the official data shows. Prices are down around 3% nationally, but on the deals we’re seeing, the top end has likely fallen 15 to 20%, and the middle of the Sydney and Melbourne market around 10% from market peak.

I don’t expect a GFC-style credit freeze. But a softer credit crunch is starting to move through the system: money is still available, but it is dearer, slower and more selective. I expect property development finance to be hit hardest, which will worsen undersupply.

Watch the interview with Ausbiz

In my view, the case for developing hasn’t been this weak in 30 years. There is another side to this. As banks tighten their credit policies, deals they would normally fund are coming to private credit lenders instead. That makes how each loan is structured matter more than ever.

Disclaimer
Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293. The information provided is general in nature and reflects the views of the speaker at the time of recording. Forward-looking information is inherently uncertain, and actual results may differ materially from projections. The information has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation or needs, and does not constitute personal financial product advice, investment advice or a recommendation. Before making any investment decision, you should consider whether the information is appropriate to your circumstances and seek independent financial advice.

Going in circles: the soft credit crunch and the iceberg ahead

IN BRIEF

— Economy: the cost of labour and the cost of capital are both on a long-term upward trajectory.

— Property: the top end has fallen hardest. Prices may be near the bottom; credit is not.

— Private credit: Bathla is the tip of an iceberg of developer stress, not a failure of the asset class.

— The outlook: a soft credit crunch. Money is still there, but dearer, slower and far pickier.

Two thousand half-built homes. Around 40 lenders. A fund freezing its redemptions. Bathla has every investor asking the same question: is this the start of something bigger? Last week we put that question, and many more, to economist Warren Hogan at our investor evening. The conversation covered three things our investors care most about: the economy, property and private credit.1

According to Warren, our economy is going through structural change, both locally and globally. Three forces are driving it: demographic change, governments’ obsession with excess spending, and the AI revolution.

The result is interest rates that stay higher for longer, and inflation that stays stubbornly above where anyone would like. That puts further downward pressure on asset prices, while GDP growth runs at a low-to-modest pace below 2%. We may avoid a technical recession unless we are hit by a major economic shock, but effective living standards will most likely keep declining.

The good news is that employment should remain sticky, and that alone underpins the economy’s resilience. We will not be thriving; we will be going through the motions.

Warren’s thesis leaves us with two uncomfortable realities about the future of the global economy: the cost of labour and the cost of capital are both on a long-term upward trajectory.

So what does that mean for property and private credit? We believe we are entering a soft credit crunch, and every investor is asking whether Bathla is the tip of the iceberg.

Part 1: The economy — it’s dependency,

The most important slide of the night wasn’t about interest rates. It was about age.

Australia’s dependency ratio, the number of young and old people relative to those of working age, fell from the early 1970s until 2010. For forty years, the workforce grew faster than the population it supported. That meant excess supply, falling inflation and falling interest rates. It was the tailwind behind almost every asset price in our lifetimes.2

That tailwind has turned. Dependency has been rising since 2010, and this year the first baby boomers turn 80. Total population is a proxy for demand; the working-age population is a proxy for supply. As dependency rises, demand grows faster than the capacity to meet it. It shows up as labour shortages. Job vacancies are still around 40% above 2019 levels.2

Immigration does not solve this at the level of the whole economy. Migrants fill vacancies, but they also bring demand: they need homes, services and infrastructure. That is why population growth of 1.4% feels so different in a housing shortage.

The second force is government. Government consumption spending across all levels now takes around 23% of GDP, up from about 19% a decade ago. And governments plan to grow that spending by around 3% in FY27, while the economy’s speed limit is about 2%. Warren’s arithmetic is simple: to get inflation down, the RBA needs 18–24 months of growth below 2%, and if government takes its 3%, the private sector can barely grow at all. The RBA is pressing the brake while Canberra presses the accelerator.2,3

The third force is AI. Research cited by Warren estimates that a quarter of Australia’s workforce is in roles at high risk of displacement, and more than half will be significantly affected. In the long run, AI may be the productivity answer Australia desperately needs. In the short run, data centres compete with housing for land, power, tradespeople and capital.4

Put the three together and you get Warren’s two uncomfortable realities. Labour is scarcer, so it costs more. Capital is in demand from ageing societies, deficit-funded governments and a global AI investment boom, so it costs more too. Australia’s 10-year bond yield has hit a 15-year high of around 5.4%, and the US 30-year yield reached a 20-year high in August.2

The RBA today lifted the cash rate for the fourth time this year, to 4.60% p.a. Warren’s central case has it above 5% by early 2027, with further hikes in November and February. His reason: after inflation, the real cash rate is barely above zero. For an economy running at its speed limit, that is not restrictive enough.5,2

The RBA is also telling us how much pain it is prepared to accept. Unemployment rose to 4.6% in August, up from 4.5% in July. A week ago, Governor Michele Bullock said that unemployment “between 4.5 and 5 (per cent) will probably take enough heat out of the labour market” to ease inflation. In other words, the RBA expects, and is prepared to accept, a softer jobs market. That matters for property: interest rates create pressure, but unemployment creates forced sellers.6,7

Headline GDP will keep growing, helped by population. But when the population grows at 1.% and the economy at 1.5% (currently trending 2.1%) being the base RBA forecast, GDP per person is barely moving. That is what “going through the motions” looks like.2

Part 2: Property — it can fall further without becoming cheap

Property is where these forces meet.

As a private credit provider secured by property, we see valuations and sales every week, and in Sydney and Melbourne this is one of the sharpest corrections at the top end of the market in recent memory. On the deals crossing our desk, blue-chip suburbs are down 15–20% from their peak, traditional mortgage-belt suburbs 10–15%, and the lower end of the market around 5%. The rest of the country is following suit. 8

Encouragingly, bargain hunters are starting to return, a sign that prices may be closer to the bottom than the top. With interest rates on the rise, it may dampen any hastened recovery in the near future. But the bottom for prices and the bottom for credit are not the same thing, and that is where this story goes next.  

The official index shows national values only around 3.6% below their March peak. That understates it: index data lags, and averages away what is happening at the edges of the market. 9

What is unusual is turnover: sales volumes are down about 40% from November 2025 peak. Listings are up 18% on a year ago, auction clearance rates have been below 50% since June, and vendor discounting is the highest since early 2023. A market that isn’t transacting is a market that can’t price itself.2,9

Here’s what many commentators miss: property can fall further without becoming cheap.

Affordability isn’t just the price. It is the price plus the cost of the money used to buy it. If rates rise faster than prices fall, borrowing capacity shrinks and affordability gets worse, not better. At the same time, construction costs keep rising. House construction costs are up about 51% since before COVID. That puts a floor under the value of new homes, because nobody builds what costs more to deliver than it sells for.10

That is the housing paradox. We need 1.2 million new homes, a target now not expected to be met until December 2030. Yet about 3,470 construction companies failed in 2025–26, one in four of all company insolvencies nationally. Every builder that fails is supply we don’t get, and that is a disaster for housing, for inflation and for the economy.10

The biggest problem in property may not be falling prices. It may be projects that simply no longer stack up. And every project that doesn’t get built keeps housing unaffordable for longer.

Part 3: Private credit — a soft crunch, not a hard freeze

Bathla Group went into administration in late August owing an estimated $3.4 to $3.6 billion to around 40 lenders. About 2,000 homes were mid-construction and a pipeline of around 14,000 more is now uncertain. 1

 

Bathla is the tip of the iceberg. Just not the iceberg you think.

So, is Bathla the tip of the iceberg?

Large-scale, highly leveraged developers, at most.

Large residential developers need a continual flow of sales, settlements and refinancing. Their model assumes the next deal funds the last one. When sales volumes fall 40%, costs rise by double digits and funding costs double, that model breaks, whoever the lender is. Bathla was simply the largest and most visible example. We expect more developers and builders to follow, particularly those whose exit plans assume an ordinary property market.

As the music stops, developers with deeper balance sheets and lower leverage will get through, as in other cycles. Higher-leveraged developers are beginning to get caught out in what is one of the most challenging times for developers in the past decades.

Recovering money in a mid-completed development site is not for the faint-hearted.  It’s much more complex than recovering a completed property which is readily saleable.

This is why not all Private Credit is the same.

 

Oncoming Credit Crunch

That is why we describe what is coming as a soft credit crunch. It is not a GFC-style freeze where money disappears overnight. Money is still available, but it is more expensive, slower and far more selective. Lenders are pulling back at the same time, redemption pressure is making some funds cautious, and borrowers who relied on easy refinancing are finding the door narrower.

 

The distinction matters because property corrections and credit crunches end differently. A property correction ends when lower prices bring buyers back. A credit crunch ends when lenders regain confidence, and that usually takes longer. Over the next twelve months, we would pay almost as much attention to debt markets as to house prices.

Defaults will rise; that is the natural consequence of this many rate rises. But default and loss are not the same thing. A senior first mortgage at a conservative loan-to-value ratio can go into default and is more likely to recover its principal in full, as a lower loan-to-value ratio gives a lender more buffer to absorb a fall in value, but recovery is never guaranteed. Loss severity depends on how the loan was structured before the stress: the LVR, the borrower’s equity, the quality of the valuation, how long enforcement takes, enforcement costs and whether there was a genuine exit.

Poorly structured credit is the risk.

What this means for investors: five questions to ask your manager

For patient, disciplined capital, a soft credit crunch is also an opportunity. When some lenders step back, good borrowers with good assets still need funding, and margins widen for those still lending. But yield should never be read without leverage, security and liquidity alongside it.

If you invest in private credit anywhere, ask your manager five questions. What is the asset? Where do I sit in the capital structure? What is the LVR? How much equity has the borrower contributed? What is the exit, a sale or just another refinance?

The Msquared difference: we lend to the borrower, not just the bricks

Those are the questions we ask ourselves on every loan.

At Msquared our approach doesn’t change with the cycle: senior first-mortgage security, conservative LVRs, disciplined valuations approach, meaningful borrower equity and a clear repayment path. In our world, boring is a compliment.

Security matters, but it is the last line of defence, not the first. At Msquared we look past the property to the person behind it. We require borrowers to have a genuine balance sheet beyond the asset we lend against. That is what gives a personal guarantee teeth: a guarantee from someone with nothing else to lose is a signature, not security. It also gives the borrower room to move in hard times, selling other assets to meet their obligations rather than handing over the keys.

We predominantly lend short-term, typically around 12 months, and every loan needs a clearly defined exit before we lend. We lend against completed property and not specialised security or land. The borrower must have a defined commercial benefit. And we lend on what a property is worth today. We rely on independent third-party valuations conducted as per our valuation policy, and we don’t lend against “highest and best use” values built on hypothetical feasibility. A value that only exists in a spreadsheet can’t repay a loan.

The era of cheap money rewarded leverage. The next era will reward discipline.

 

Paul Miron, Co-Founder and Managing Director, Msquared Capital

Sources

  1. ABC News, “Bathla Group’s collapse may be imminent as funding deadline brought forward”, 1 Sep 2026; The Adviser, “ASIC puts private credit on notice after Bathla collapse”, Sep 2026; MacroBusiness, “Bathla’s collapse ripples across private credit market”, Sep 2026. Reported debt ranges from $3.2bn to $3.6bn.
  2. Warren Hogan (EQ Economics, Economic Advisor to Judo Bank), “Australian Economic Outlook 2027: The Great Transformation”, presentation at the Msquared Capital investor evening, Sydney, 24 Sep 2026, drawing on ABS, RBA, UN, NAB, Treasury and Cotality data.
  3. World Bank, World Development Indicators, “General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) – Australia” (via YCharts): 23.2% in 2025, 19.1% in 2015.
  4. Research cited in Hogan (2026): Anthropic; Clinton Free, University of Sydney; ABS; Judo Bank; EQ Economics.
  5. Reserve Bank of Australia, “Statement by the Monetary Policy Board: Monetary Policy Decision”, 29 Sep 2026.
  6. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force, Australia, August 2026 (released 24 Sep 2026).
  7. Michele Bullock, Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia, remarks at a Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) event, Sydney, 22 Sep 2026, as reported by CommBank Newsroom and HRD.
  8. Msquared Capital observations from valuations and sales across its lending activity, Sydney and Melbourne, Sep 2026. Indicative ranges, not an index.
  9. Cotality, Home Value Index and Monthly Housing Chart Pack, Sep 2026 (data to August 2026).
  10. ABC News, “Australia has a housing shortage. So why are Bathla and other home builders collapsing?”, 8 Sep 2026 (citing ASIC insolvency data and federal housing forecasts).
  11. ABC News, “ASIC warns of ‘first significant cracks’ in Australian private credit”, 27 Aug 2026; ASIC, Opening Statement to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 4 Sep 2026.

Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293.

The information provided is general in nature and reflects the views of the author at the time of publication. Forward-looking information is inherently uncertain, and actual results may differ materially from projections. The information has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation or needs, and does not constitute personal financial product advice, investment advice or a recommendation. Not an offer to invest. Investments in the Fund’s products are not bank deposits and the performance of the Fund, return of capital or payment of distributions are not guaranteed. Before making any investment decision, you should consider whether the information is appropriate to your circumstances and seek independent financial advice. Views attributed to Warren Hogan reflect his presentation on 24 September 2026, delivered on behalf of Judo Bank; Msquared Capital) has not independently verified, and does not warrant or accept liability for, the accuracy, currency or completeness of any information presented.

Land value of Sydney home unlocks $1m working capital same day

  • Working capital required to fund a new opportunity for an architectural firm  
  • Loan backed by a residential asset with 60% LVR
  • Local valuers had a 15 business-day turnaround time in a peak period, when the borrower needed funds within 20 business days
  • Msquared Capital resolved valuation challenges same day

 

Clearing a valuation hurdle same day

NSW lending specialist Adrian Dracopoulos explains how Msquared Capital workshopped a solution same day that helped save a borrower thousands while meeting settlement deadlines.

We consider more property

Msquared Capital takes a commercial approach to lending. We have one of the most diverse valuation panels in private lending with access to the names the big banks like to see.

Download lending guide

General information only and does not constitute financial, investment, or legal advice. Msquared Capital’s lending activities are limited to writing loans for business and/or investment purposes only. The consumer protections in the National Credit Code do not apply.

Developer cracks expose private credit fault line

A major developer in distress, billions in debt spread across the private credit market, and a wave of investor phone calls asking one question: am I exposed? Msquared Capital Co-Founder & Fund Manager Paul Miron explains the credit discipline behind Msquared Capital’s lending.

Over the past week there has been significant media coverage of a large Sydney property developer in distress, and of the private credit funds exposed to it. According to The Australian, more than 18 private credit funds have in excess of $3 billion in debt tied to the group. Predictably, investors have been calling to ask whether we have any exposure — and they are right to ask.

Investors should understand exactly what sits inside their portfolio — not just the headline return, but the type of debt they own and the risks that come with it. That is the real question this month’s article addresses.

“Msquared Capital has no lending exposure to the Bathla Group”

The current snapshot: a two-speed correction

On current data, national dwelling values are in a genuine correction. Our base case is a peak-to-trough fall of around 10%, but the national average hides what is happening at the extremes: some segments and geographies will correct considerably harder — beyond 15% — while others are merely braking1.

The auction clearance rate is the truest leading indicator, and it has been sitting below 50% in Sydney and Melbourne since late May. That is not softness. That is a correction the aggregate data now confirms.

Over the past year the split has become unmistakable. Sydney and Melbourne have rolled from solid gains into accelerating monthly falls (-1.2% and -1.0% in June). The mid-sized capital cities that led the boom — Perth, Brisbane, Adelaide — peaked around the turn of the year and are now decelerating hard from monthly gains above 2% toward flat.

The first chart below tracks all five mainland capital cities month by month, with the RBA’s three 2026 cash-rate hikes and the 12 May federal budget marked: Sydney and Melbourne accelerated lower through precisely that window. The correction is real, but it is not uniform, and that distinction matters enormously for anyone lending against property2,3.

Chart: Monthly dwelling change by capital city, July 2025 – June 2026


Based on Cotality Home Value Index, monthly % change by capital city, July 2025 – June 2026.

The deterioration in both the economy and property began early this year — the product of sticky inflation, higher interest rates and excess government spending. Post-budget, that deterioration has accelerated, draining confidence from the market. Housing remains the single largest contributor to inflation, running at 6.5% over the year. Advertised rents are still climbing against sub-2% vacancy, and while the official CPI rent measure has eased to 3.6%, that lagging series has yet to catch up to what new tenants are paying — so the pressure on the very renters this budget claimed to help is still in the pipeline3,4,5.

Crucially, none of this arrived without warning. The two most reliable leading indicators — consumer sentiment and auction clearance rates — both rolled over months before dwelling values turned negative. The second chart makes the sequence plain: national values sit as bars, with clearance rates and consumer sentiment overlaid as lines, and the three cash-rate hikes (February, March and May) and budget night marked.

Sentiment was already mired in deeply pessimistic territory and slid to a two-and-a-half-year low well before February’s first hike; clearance rates fell through 60% in March and below the 50% mark that historically signals sustained falls by late May. National values only tipped negative in June — just after the third hike and the budget landed together in May. Prices were the last domino, not the first6.

Chart: National prices vs auction clearances and consumer sentiment, July 2025 – June 2026

National dwelling value change (bars) against auction clearance rates and consumer sentiment (lines), July 2025 – June 2026. Sources: Cotality (formerly CoreLogic) Home Value Index — dwelling values, and weekly auction data — clearance rates (shown as monthly combined-capitals approximations); Westpac–Melbourne Institute Consumer Sentiment Index (100 = neutral). RBA cash-rate rises (3 Feb, 17 Mar, 5 May 2026) and the Federal Budget (12 May 2026) as marked.

Why is it going so wrong, so quickly?

We were presented with a budget supposedly designed to fix the housing crisis and inequality. Its own papers show otherwise. The strategy was to dampen investor demand — investors transact around 40% of the market — in order to push prices down and call the result affordability, while offering nothing on the supply side.

The consequence is that the velocity of money and property transactions is falling off a cliff. That hits two groups hardest: property developers and state governments. Fewer sales mean less stamp duty, less business activity, and less of the revenue base that funds schools, hospitals and roads. Property in Australia is both the heart and the glue of the economy — and all of this is being done while raising taxes on the businesses that collectively employ five million people. The unintended consequence, in my view, is a catalyst that materially raises the risk of recession over the next two years.

Where this becomes a nightmare — and where the real risk sits

For a developer, a few months of slowing sales starves the cash flow needed to service interest, pay staff and buy materials. Margins were already thin; as prices fall and sales stall, debt can end up exceeding the value of the asset. That is a developer solvency problem, and it happens in every cycle. It is being reported as a private credit problem.

The distinction that matters is within secured private credit. In a traditional loan, security is a recovery mechanism: if the borrower defaults, you realise the asset and recover your capital and interest. A development loan layers on two additional risks — construction risk (cost escalation, the builder failing, supply chain) and construction specific market risk (relying on an end product selling at a price assumed years earlier). Right now both are moving against borrowers at once: higher build costs meeting softer end values.

This is the inherent risk of construction and development lending, and too often it is not priced in. As investors, allocators and advisers have chased higher returns, they have placed less emphasis on the type of loans sitting inside pooled funds. We had the warnings — the Adgemis collapse, and ASIC flagging its concern about private credit exposure to speculative real estate. The market was largely unfazed7.

Our long-standing investors have heard me say it hundreds of times before:

“There would come a day when the front page of the AFR carried a large developer collapse and losses on speculative construction and second-mortgage lending”.

Concentration risk is an issue

Concentration risk, investor perception and understanding of risk is the most important issue. What matters for investors is what actually sits beneath the label “private credit.” Lending to fund construction and development is a fundamentally different exposure to short-term business lending secured by completed property.

The former depends on a project being built and then sold at a price assumed years earlier; the latter is serviced from a borrower’s cash flow, with completed property as security. Both can be done well, but they do not carry the same risk — and a fund heavily concentrated in a single developer, or a single type of loan, can behave very differently when the cycle turns.

The lesson is a simple one, and it is the same one we have always put to investors: you should be able to see clearly what your capital is lending against, and understand how those structures are likely to behave under stress.

This is why the Msquared Mortgage Income Fund (MMIF)8 is built the way it is. Every loan is secured by a registered first-ranking mortgage over completed and established residential, commercial, retail or industrial real estate. The Fund does not lend for the construction or development of the security property, and does not lend against vacant land or a development project.

Borrowers are assessed on their character, cash flow and capacity to service the loan against a defined exit — because, as this cycle is making plain, servicing and exit matter as much as the security behind them.

We are not changing our approach, because the Fund was purpose-built for periods like this. What has changed is the opportunity set: as some lenders turn more cautious, well-secured short-term lending is, in our view, being priced more attractively.

So when an investor asks whether they are exposed to the next headline, our answer is the same as it has always been — ask your manager what you are lending against.

Disclaimer & sources

1 Property values are subject to a wide range of known and unknown risks, including but not limited to: changes in government policy and their impacts, interest rate movements, employment conditions, credit availability, and broader economic shocks. Actual outcomes may differ materially from any projections or ranges discussed.

2 Cotality, Monthly Housing Chart Pack — July 2026.

3 Reserve Bank of Australia, Cash Rate Target.

4 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Australia, May 2026.

5 Cotality

6 Westpac–Melbourne Institute, Consumer Sentiment Bulletin, June 2026.

7 ASIC Report 814, Private credit in Australia (September 2025).

8 One Managed Investment Funds Limited ACN 117 400 987 AFSL 297042 (OIG) is responsible entity and issuer of units in Msquared Mortgage Income Fund ARSN 682 099 350 (MMIF or Fund). Msquared Capital Retail Funds Management Pty Ltd ACN 679 611 146 is the investment manager of MMIF (Manager). The Manager is a corporate authorised representative (no. 1312858) of One Investment Administration Ltd ACN 072 899 060 AFSL 225064 (OIAL) in respect of financial services provided to ‘retail clients’ (as defined in the Corporations Act) (Retail Clients). The Manager is also a corporate authorised representative (no. 1312533) of Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293 (Msquared Capital) in respect of financial services (including general financial product advice in relation to the Fund) provided to ‘wholesale clients’ only (as defined in the Corporations Act) (Wholesale Clients). The information provided on this website (Information) is general in nature and does not constitute investment or personal financial product advice, and does not take into account your investment objectives, particular needs or financial situation. You should seek independent financial advice. *Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. The payment, specific rate of return and frequency of distributions are not guaranteed. Performance comparisons are provided purely for information purposes only and should not be relied upon. The Information may include information that is predictive in character which may be affected by inaccurate assumptions or by known or unknown risks and uncertainties and may differ materially from results ultimately achieved. Neither OIG, Msquared Capital, Manager nor any of their related entities guarantee the performance of the Fund or the repayment of any investor’s capital, and neither give any representation or warranty as to the reliability, completeness or accuracy of the Information and do not accept liability for any inaccurate, incomplete or omitted information or any losses caused by using this Information. Not an offer to invest. You should carefully consider the respective Fund’s disclosure documents, including Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) and Target Market Determination (TMD) for the MMIF before making any decision about whether to acquire, or continue to hold, an interest in the Fund. Applications for units in the Funds can only be made pursuant to the application form relevant to the Fund. The PDS and TMD can be obtained from www.msquaredcapital.com.au.

Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293. The information provided is general in nature and reflects the views of the author at the time of publication. Forward-looking information is inherently uncertain, and actual results may differ materially from projections. The information has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation or needs, and does not constitute personal financial product advice, investment advice or a recommendation. Not an offer to invest. Investments in the Fund’s products are not bank deposits and the performance of the Fund, return of capital or payment of distributions are not guaranteed. Before making any investment decision, you should consider whether the information is appropriate to your circumstances and seek independent financial advice.

 

Property downturn reveals private credit cracks

There are parts of the private credit market that will struggle over the next 12-24 months, predicts Msquared Capital’s Paul Miron. In his latest interview with Ausbiz, he says construction and development lending is particularly vulnerable to economic conditions and contagion risks. Budget measures continue to see turbulence in property valuations, while at the same time, debt-laden developers rely on constant property sales to sustain cash flow.

  • Msquared Capital predicts broad property price declines from their 2026 peak of at least 10%, with some segments down 15–20%
  • Construction and development lending is viewed as high risk amid rising costs and falling end values
  • Expects some private credit assets will be challenged for the next 12-24 months

 

Watch the interview with Ausbiz

Disclaimer

One Managed Investment Funds Limited ACN 117 400 987 AFSL 297042 (OIG) is responsible entity and issuer of units in Msquared Mortgage Income Fund ARSN 682 099 350 (MMIF or Fund). Msquared Capital Retail Funds Management Pty Ltd ACN 679 611 146 is the investment manager of MMIF (Manager). The Manager is a corporate authorised representative (no. 1312858) of One Investment Administration Ltd ACN 072 899 060 AFSL 225064 (OIAL) in respect of financial services provided to ‘retail clients’ (as defined in the Corporations Act) (Retail Clients). The Manager is also a corporate authorised representative (no. 1312533) of Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293 (Msquared Capital) in respect of financial services (including general financial product advice in relation to the Fund) provided to ‘wholesale clients’ only (as defined in the Corporations Act) (Wholesale Clients). The information provided on this website (Information) is general in nature and does not constitute investment or personal financial product advice, and does not take into account your investment objectives, particular needs or financial situation. You should seek independent financial advice.
*Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. The payment, specific rate of return and frequency of distributions are not guaranteed. Performance comparisons are provided purely for information purposes only and should not be relied upon. The Information may include information that is predictive in character which may be affected by inaccurate assumptions or by known or unknown risks and uncertainties and may differ materially from results ultimately achieved. Neither OIG, Msquared Capital, Manager nor any of their related entities guarantee the performance of the Fund or the repayment of any investor’s capital, and neither give any representation or warranty as to the reliability, completeness or accuracy of the Information and do not accept liability for any inaccurate, incomplete or omitted information or any losses caused by using this Information. Not an offer to invest. You should carefully consider the respective Fund’s disclosure documents, including Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) and Target Market Determination (TMD) for the MMIF before making any decision about whether to acquire, or continue to hold, an interest in the Fund. Applications for units in the Funds can only be made pursuant to the application form relevant to the Fund.

Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293. The information provided is general in nature and reflects the views of the speaker at the time of recording. Forward-looking information is inherently uncertain, and actual results may differ materially from projections. The information has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation or needs, and does not constitute personal financial product advice, investment advice or a recommendation. Before making any investment decision, you should consider whether the information is appropriate to your circumstances and seek independent financial advice.

Property values are subject to a wide range of known and unknown risks, including but not limited to: changes in government policy and their impacts, interest rate movements, employment conditions, credit availability, and broader economic shocks. Actual outcomes may differ materially from any projections or ranges discussed.

Msquared Capital appoints new CCO following $1.5bn lending milestone

Msquared Capital has appointed a new chief commercial officer and expanded its origination team after surpassing $1.5 billion in commercial lending.

Written by Julian Barnes – Broker Daily

Michael Volkiene has been promoted from general manager – loan origination and credit to the newly created chief commercial officer (CCO) role.

A former Australia New Zealand Banking Group executive, he will oversee the firm’s product development strategy and investor and lending businesses.

Before joining Msquared Capital, Volkiene spent almost 20 years at ANZ, where he led a lending division focused on growing the bank’s broker channel.

The appointment comes as the private credit firm looks to expand its footprint, citing tighter bank lending criteria, growing demand for non-bank finance and a shortage of experienced credit professionals across the sector.

Co-founder Paul Myliotis said the business was continuing to invest in its people, distribution network and product offering.

“These appointments enhance our ability to scale while maintaining the lending quality our investors and borrowers expect,” he said.

Myliotis said Volkiene had played a key role in growing the firm’s lending business and expanding its broker distribution, with its products now available to around 70 per cent of brokers.

Volkiene said demand for private credit remained strong, particularly from businesses looking to unlock value from their real estate assets.

“These borrowers often require tailored solutions, and I’m excited by the opportunity to continue growing a business focused on delivering certainty in complex lending scenarios,” he said.

Msquared Capital said it currently sources capital through institutional mandates, managed funds for retail and wholesale investors, and its own balance sheet.

The firm has also appointed Michael Taipi to its Melbourne office to support brokers, with further appointments planned in Sydney and Brisbane.

Taipi previously owned and operated a mortgage broking business for more than 12 years.

Volkiene said Taipi’s experience as a broker would help strengthen the firm’s relationships with the third-party channel.

“Michael Taipi’s first-hand understanding of the broker journey, combined with extensive expertise in relationship management and commercial lending, gives him a unique perspective on what brokers need to succeed,” he said.

Disclaimer:

General information only and does not constitute financial, investment, or legal advice. Msquared Capital’s lending activities are limited to writing loans for business and/or investment purposes only. The consumer protections in the National Credit Code do not apply.

Robin Hood politics might break the economy

Australia’s housing crisis is entering a far more dangerous phase than most people realise warns Msquared Capital Co‑Founder & Fund Manager Paul Miron. He argues the government has accidentally engineered a supply freeze in the very part of the market where supply is most needed, with new tax settings hitting investors, tightening credit, and pushing rents higher. Measures may even push Australia’s future housing stock into the hands of offshore institutional capital.

For months, I have been one of the very few commentators openly stating what the data was already showing: property prices had already begun to fall. The auction clearance rate is the true indicator, and when it slips below 55% in Sydney and Melbourne for consecutive weeks, that is not a sign of softness — that is a correction. The aggregate data now confirms it.

Last week’s Cotality release (1 June 2026) puts the picture beyond debate. The national Home Value Index was flat (0.0%) in May, with Sydney down 0.9% and Melbourne down 0.8% — the two cities driving the downturn and absorbing the full weight of the Budget’s tax-side intervention. Matt Bell, chief economist at Oliver Hume Property Group, described the result as the moment the national housing market “came to a grinding halt.” ANZ has cut its national capital city forecast to 2.8% growth for the year, down from 4.8% in April. CBA has cut its forecast by nearly a third. In the top quartile of Sydney and Melbourne, prices have now fallen for five consecutive months.

So the Budget arrived at the worst possible time, with the wrong prescription, to treat a problem it fundamentally misunderstands.

The Treasurer, Jim Chalmers, has suggested, “If we are making it easier for first-home buyers to get a fair crack at auctions, then that’s a good thing.” The reality is more complicated.

Politicians are playing Russian Roulette with our economy. Driving property prices down does not just hand a discount to the first-home buyer — it hits the 1.4 million Australians the property sector employs, the 67% of household wealth tied to housing, and the state government revenue base that funds schools, hospitals and roads.

The government had a choice: increase Robin Hood taxes on property and business, or cut government spending, link migration growth to supply completions, and allow the free market to find its own efficiency. It chose the former.

Systemic risk, not sector problem

Property is not simply one investment class among many. It holds approximately 67% of all Australian household wealth and contributes roughly 10.6% to GDP directly, and up to 15% when flow-on effects are included. It employs over 1.4 million Australians across construction, sales, finance, and related industries — almost five times the direct employment of the mining sector, which so often monopolises the national conversation. Property pays more tax to federal and state coffers than mining. It is the engine room of the wealth effect that drives consumer confidence and spending. When property wobbles, the entire economy wobbles with it.

Against that backdrop, the May 2026 Budget chose to remove negative gearing from established residential properties purchased after Budget night, and to replace the 50% CGT discount with cost-base indexation and a 30% minimum tax from 1 July 2027. The government calls this fairness. I call it a misdiagnosis with dangerous consequences. Property price decline will have a material impact on the economy — and property investors play an important role in the ecosystem that policymakers appear to have discounted entirely.

The grandfathering trap

The policy is not just flawed — it is internally contradictory in a way that will actively make the rental market worse before it gets better.

Every property purchased before Budget night is grandfathered: those investors keep their full negative gearing and CGT discount until they sell. The rational response for any existing investor is simple — hold. Do not sell. Reduce supply to the rental pool, constrain transaction volumes, and wait.

This is not a theory. It is basic human behaviour in response to a tax incentive. The government has accidentally engineered a supply freeze in the exact segment of the market — established residential rental property — where supply is most needed. Fewer transactions means less stamp duty revenue for state governments. Fewer rental listings means higher rents. Higher rents feed directly back into CPI, which remains the RBA’s primary concern and the justification for a cash rate that is now back at 4.35%.

The government is, in effect, using one hand to fight inflation and with the other hand, fuelling it.

Who actually invests in residential property?

Here is the detail that gets lost in the politics of this debate. According to ATO data, 71% of property investors own exactly one investment property. These are not the super-wealthy using a labyrinthine tax structure to accumulate portfolios. These are teachers, nurses, police officers, and small business owners who saved enough to buy one additional property as part of their retirement plan.

For this cohort, the investment property is not a luxury. It is the mechanism by which ordinary Australians participate in their country’s infrastructure. It is the tangible, understood, and historically reliable way to build intergenerational wealth when compulsory superannuation alone is insufficient. Removing the tax incentive that made this viable does not hurt a faceless property mogul. It pulls the ladder up on the nurse in Parramatta.

The deeper inequity is who benefits from their exit.

Property investors not to blame for affordability

It is true that since negative gearing and capital gains tax concessions were introduced, housing affordability has declined significantly. These incentives may have contributed by increasing investor demand — but they are not the primary cause.

Significant research by Ross Kendall and Peter Tulip — both senior economists at the RBA at the time of publication (RBA Research Discussion Paper, 2018) — quantified how planning and zoning restrictions raise prices above the marginal cost of supply. As of 2016, zoning raised detached house prices 73% above marginal cost in Sydney, 69% in Melbourne, 42% in Brisbane, and 54% in Perth. The principal drivers of affordability deterioration have been low interest rates over an extended period, high population growth, chronic under-supply, and restricted access to development-ready land. Tax incentives for private investors has not been main driving force for the affordability crises and price growth.

Punishing the private investor does not address any of these structural drivers. It simply removes the capital that historically kept the private rental market functioning.

The build to rent imbalance no one is talking about

At the same time that the government is restricting tax benefits for the Australian mum-and-dad investor, it has created a materially superior tax environment for foreign institutional capital through Build-to-Rent (BTR).

Under the BTR framework, foreign institutional investors operating through a Managed Investment Trust (MIT) pay a withholding tax rate of just 15% on fund payments — down from 30%. They also benefit from an accelerated capital works deduction of 4% per year (compared to 2.5% previously), writing off construction costs over 25 years instead of 40. And crucially, BTR developments are explicitly exempt from the negative gearing restrictions announced in this Budget.

Table 1: Federal Tax Treatment — Australian Investor vs. Foreign BTR Institutional Investor

Source: ATO Build-to-Rent Development Tax Incentives; Baker McKenzie Budget Analysis May 2026; William Buck Federal Budget Analysis 2026.


“Every major state has handed foreign institutions a tax advantage unavailable to any Australian private investor.”

The asymmetry does not end at the federal level. At the state level, every major jurisdiction — NSW, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, and South Australia — has introduced additional BTR concessions that further widen the gap. These include 50% reductions in land tax, full exemptions from foreign investor surcharges, and exemptions from additional foreign acquirer duty. The Australian mum-and-dad investor receives none of these benefits.

Table 2: State & Territory Concessions — BTR (Foreign Institutional) vs. Australian Private Investor

Source: Revenue NSW; State Revenue Office Victoria; Queensland Revenue Office; KPMG BTR State Concessions Analysis; Johnson Winter Slattery BTR Update 2026; Clayton Utz State Budget Review 2025.


The cumulative picture is striking. A foreign institutional investor acquiring a BTR asset in NSW today benefits from: a 50% permanent reduction in land tax, a full exemption from the 5% foreign land tax surcharge, a full exemption from the 9% foreign surcharge purchaser duty, a 15% MIT withholding rate (versus the standard 30%), and accelerated depreciation at 4% per annum. They are also exempt from the negative gearing abolition. The Australian private investor receives none of these benefits, and from 2027, loses the ones they had.

This is not solving the housing crisis. It is transferring ownership of it — from Australians to offshore institutional capital, with profits repatriated abroad and an accumulating tax advantage that no private Australian investor can match.

The unintended consequences are already in the credit cycle

What the modellers and Treasury economists consistently underestimate is the transmission through the credit cycle.

We are already seeing it at Major Banks are removing negative gearing from serviceability calculations for new investment property loans. In a falling market, lenders become less willing to support clients who are underwater, and less willing to extend credit to new investors whose cash flow projections no longer stack up without the tax benefit. The velocity of property transactions is already slowing — a direct consequence of policy uncertainty and reduced investor appetite.

This matters for state governments in ways that are rarely discussed. Transfer duty — stamp duty — is the single largest own-source revenue item for most state governments. NSW generates over $12 billion per year from transfer duty alone. Victoria, Queensland, and Western Australia rely on it to fund public infrastructure, health, and education. If transaction volumes fall by 15–20% as investor demand retreats and market confidence weakens, the revenue impact on state budgets is not marginal — it is a structural hole.

A slowdown in property transactions does not only impact stamp duty. It flows through to GST on new builds, payroll tax on construction workers, and land tax assessments. The multiplier effect of property on state government revenue has been chronically underappreciated, and the federal government has made a decision with enormous state fiscal consequences without, it appears, adequately consulting those who bear them.

The 95% loan trap

There is one more element of this Budget that genuinely concerns me, and it sits on the other side of the ledger.

The government has expanded access to first-home buyer deposit guarantee schemes, allowing eligible buyers to purchase with a 5% deposit guaranteed by the Commonwealth. The intention is benign — help young Australians into the market. The reality is that in a market already showing signs of correction, thousands of buyers are being lured into 95% loan-to-value mortgages at the top of an uncertain cycle. According to Housing Australia 300,000 applications have been sought.

If property prices in Sydney and Melbourne decline 10–15% from peak — which is already occurring in some segments — a buyer who entered on a 5% deposit has immediate negative equity. They become prisoners of their mortgage. They cannot sell without crystallising a loss they cannot afford to absorb. The taxpayer guarantees their loan. The bank is protected. The buyer is trapped.

This is not intergenerational wealth creation. It is an intergenerational debt obligation. I would never advise my own children to borrow at 95% LVR — that goes against thirty years of working with debt. The fact that the government is actively encouraging this level of leverage is, at the very least, irresponsible.

Where this leaves investors

In the near term, capital reallocation across the investment landscape appears rational and unsurprising given the policy environment. A number of investors appear to be increasing weightings toward income-generating assets while the medium-term outlook — both policy and market — becomes clearer.

On the property market itself, a disorderly correction appears unlikely given property’s structural importance to household wealth and state government revenue. But we are in a period of genuine adjustment — and the Budget has extended the duration of that adjustment.

The government had a genuine opportunity to address the housing crisis by incentivising supply, reforming planning, and reducing construction costs. Instead, it chose Robin Hood politics. The optics are appealing. The economics are not.

Every Australian will feel the consequences — in higher rents, slower wealth creation, and a future where large portions of Australia’s rental stock are owned by offshore institutions extracting returns from tenants who were, once, able to aspire to ownership of their own.

Disclaimer

Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293. This article is for general information purposes only and has been prepared without taking into account your individual objectives, financial situation, or needs. It does not constitute personal financial product advice, investment advice, or a recommendation to acquire or dispose of any financial product. Before making any investment decision, you should seek independent financial, legal, and taxation advice. This article contains forward-looking statements and opinions that reflect the author’s views as at June 2026 and may not reflect subsequent market, legislative, or policy developments. Msquared Capital has not independently verified all third-party data and does not warrant its accuracy or completeness; data was current as at the date of publication and may have changed.

A better solution to Australia’s housing crisis is unfolding 16,500km away

Changes to negative gearing and capital gains tax have already triggered a sharp pullback in investor demand for property. Msquared Capital Co-Founder and Fund Manager Paul Miron warns property prices could fall materially more than 10% if clearance rates keep trending below 50%.

In his view, the real drivers of Australia’s affordability crisis aren’t negative gearing, but unsustainable migration levels, slow planning approvals and a challenged construction sector. To solve the housing supply crisis, he points to Canada, where reducing migration intake 20% has already eased rents and housing-driven inflation.

Miron also flags a knock-on risk closer to home: grandfathering rules will discourage landlords from selling, dragging down property turnover and the stamp duty revenue states rely on to fund essential services.

Key points:

  • Budget tax changes seen as worsening housing supply and rental pressures
  • Grandfathering rules viewed as reducing property turnover and state stamp duty revenue
  • Canada’s migration cuts cited as a model for lowering rents and inflation

 

Watch the interview with Ausbiz

Disclaimer:

Msquared Capital Pty Ltd ACN 622 507 297 AFSL 520293. The information provided is general in nature and reflects the views of the speaker at the time of recording. Forward-looking information is inherently uncertain, and actual results may differ materially from projections. The information has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation or needs, and does not constitute personal financial product advice, investment advice or a recommendation. Before making any investment decision, you should consider whether the information is appropriate to your circumstances and seek independent financial advice.

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